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Markman v. Westview: Juries and Patent
Infringement Suits
(or Why Is That Jury in the Courtroom, Anyway?)
DANE C. BUTZER*
"Mhe patent system.., added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, in
the discovery and production of new and useful things."**
I. INTRODUCTION
Markman v. Westview Instrnents, Inc.' started life as a fairly typical
patent infringement suit. The patent holders, Herbert Markman and Positek,
Inc., sued the defendants, Westview Instruments, Inc. and Althon Enterprises,
Inc., for using a patented invention2 without permission.3 The key issue was a
common one in patent suits-the meaning of a term in the allegedly infringed
claims. 4 However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' 5 en banc opinion for
* I would like to thank Patricia L. Prior, Esq., for her assistance with this project.
Defects, if any, are attributable to me alone. I would also like to thank my family and friends
for their support.
** President Lincoln made this comment in a speech before the Phi Alpha Society of
Illinois College delivered at Jacksonville in 1859. See Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on
Discoveries and Inventions, in 3 THE CouECTED WoRKs OF ABRAHAM LINcoLN 356, 363
(R.P. Basler ed. 1953).
1 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991), af4'd,
52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
2 "Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores," U.S. Reissue
Patent No. 33,054 [hereinafter '054 patent], issued on Sept. 12, 1989, 1106 U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFIcE, OFFICAL GAZETrE OF THE U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFMCFE 760-61 (1989) [hereinafter OFFIcIAL GAzETrE] as a reissue of U.S.
Patent No. 4,550,246 issued on Oct. 29, 1985. 1059 OFFIcIAL GAzr, supra, at 2287. See
infra note 27 for an explanation of reissue patents.
3 SeeMarlanan, 772 F. Supp. at 1536-37.
4 See id. Claims are the part of a patent that give patent holders their legal rights. See
infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
5 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in
patent cases from all district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (4)(C). It has national
geographic jurisdiction in the patent area. See id.
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this case, 6 which was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court,7 sent shock
waves through the intellectual property law profession. 8 The court ruled that the
interpretation of language used in a patent claim is a matter of law solely for the
court.9
As a result of the Markman ruling, 10 juries are entirely excluded from
claim construction, one of the two steps in patent infringement analysis." The
ruling, therefore, has significant ramifications for patent litigation' 2 and
deserves close examination.
This Case Comment analyzes the Markman ruling in light of precedent, the
Seventh Amendment, and various conceptions of patent infringement. In view
of this analysis, the Markman ruling is largely correct. 13 However, one
significant issue of fact that can affect the interpretation of the language used in
a patent claim should remain for jury consideration.14 This issue arises when
the prosecution history15 is unclear about the occurrence of events during the
prosecution of the patent application. In that case, the issue of what actually
transpired during prosecution should be left to the jury.16
This Case Comment is divided into eight parts. Part II is a brief overview
of patents and patent infringement. This part is provided as a foundation for
readers who do not have a patent background. Part III is a summary of the
district court's decision, the Federal Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court's
decision, and the issues in Markman. Part IV is a discussion of some of the
ramifications of the Markman ruling. These ramifications range from the
precedential value of claim language interpretation as a matter of law to the jury
instructions used in litigation. Part V is an analysis of the relevant precedent, a
good deal of which is in conflict. Part VI is a Seventh Amendment analysis of
the Markman ruling. Part VII discusses analogies of patents to contracts and
6 See Markan, 52 F.3d at 967.
7 SeeMarlanan, 116 S. Ct. at 1387.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 See Markan, 52 F.3d at 970-71, 979.
10 The ruling that the interpretation of language used in patent claims is a matter of law
solely for the courts is referred to as the Markan ruling throughout the rest of this Case
Comment.
" See infra Part II.C.2.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part VIII.
14 Throughout this Case Comment, the factfinder is assumed to be a jury. However, the
same principles apply when the factfinder is a judge.
15 Prosecution history refers to the record of the proceedings before the Patent and
Trademark Office in acquiring a patent. See infra Part II.C. 1.
16 See infra notes 247-58 and accompanying text.
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statutes. These analogies are necessary both to settle the Seventh Amendment
issue and to determine the proper way to interpret claim language. Part VIII is
the conclusion.
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF PATENT LAW
This Part is intended as a basic survey for the reader who is unfamiliar with
patent law. Basically, a patent is a grant by the federal government to an
inventor for the "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
or selling" their invention. 17 While the following material is accurate, it is also
somewhat cursory. 18
A. Why Do We Have Patents?
The patent system encourages inventors to invent by granting them
exclusive rights to their inventions for a limited time. These rights are often
assigned to the corporations that funded the inventors' activities, thereby
rewarding the corporations for encouraging invention and encouraging the
development of new technologies. These new technologies lead to new jobs,
new industries, new consumer goods, and trade benefits. 19 Thus, the interests
of the public are served by rewarding inventors' efforts with patents. 20
17 See infra Part ll.C.2 for a discussion of infringement, the use of a patented invention
by someone other than the patent holder or an assignee.
18The interested reader should consult any of the following treatises for a more
thorough discussion of patent law: DONALD S. CHSm, PATENTS (1993) (providing a
continuously updated multi-volume loose leaf exposition on patents); ROBERT L. HARMON,
PATNrs AND THE FEDERAL CiRculT (3d ed. 1994) (focusing on the treatment of patent law
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); RONALD B. HI-DRERm, PATEnT LAw: A
PRAcrmONER's GUIDE (1988) (focusing on issues relevant to the practitioner); EiNsr
BA RiDGE LIPSCOmB III, LIpSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS (3d ed. 1984) (providing a
more extensive eleven volume survey of the field); THOMAs TERRELL, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE RELATING TO LETrERS PATENT FOR hvENTIONs (1991).
19 See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cited in
HARMON, supra note 18, § 1.2, at 8.
20 See TERRaL, supra note 18, at 1. The concept of serving the public good by means
of rewarding inventors is not new. Long before the United States even existed, Venice and
England had provisions for patents. The first modem patent statute was enacted in Venice
around 1432. See WILuAM H. FRANcis & ROBERT C. CoLuNs, CASES AND MATERIAs ON
PATENT LAW 5 (4th ed. 1995). Roughly 200 years later, England passed the Statute of
Monopolies to restrict the overly common and corrupt granting of monopolies by the crown.
Statute 21, James I, ch. 3 (1623), cited in FRANCiS & COLLINs, supra, at 69. Grants of
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B. The Constitution
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States grants
Congress "the Power To... promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 21 Note that the purpose of this grant
of power is expressly incorporated into the clause. As long as Congress acts in
accordance with this purpose, it can select the "policy which in its judgment
best effectuates the constitutional aim." 22
C. Modem Patent Law in the United States
Current patent laws are set forth in Title 35 of the United States Code.23
The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has authority from Congress to
establish rules and regulations for the prosecution of patent applications. 24
These rules and regulations are set forth in Title 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.25 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedures sets forth detailed
procedures to be followed during patent prosecution.26
1. Acquiring a Patent
In order to acquire a patent,27 an inventor must file a patent
application 28 with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.29
letters-patent to inventors were expressly exempted from the restrictions created by the Statute
of Monopolies. See id. The concept that patents for inventions serve the public good was also
considered to be important enough to be incorporated into the United States Constitution in
1789. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
23 See HaIDREMH, supra note 18, at 3.
24 See id. Patent prosecution refers to the proceedings related "to the granting and
issuing of patents." Id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 Several types of patents exist: utility patents, design patents, and plant patents. See
l-D DRgEn, supra note 18, at 5-7. The focus of this Case Comment is on utility patents,
which are acquired for inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents or
discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title."). Design patents cover new, original, and ornamental designs
of articles of manufacture. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). Plant patents cover invented or
[Vol. 58:271
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Basically, an application consists of a specification describing the
invention,30 drawings if necessary for understanding the invention, 31
models or specimens if required by the Commissioner,32 a fee33 (of
course), and an oath.34 The specification must conclude with "one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention. '' 35 The claims are
discovered distinct and new varieties of asexually reproduced plants. See 35 U.S.C. § 161
(1994).
The particular patent at issue in Marknan was a reissued utility patent. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Patents can be reissued to
correct errors that occur "without deceptive intent." See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994). The
pertinent statute reads:
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly
or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by
reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent,
the Commissioner shall, on the surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee
required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and
in accordance with a new and amended application, for the unexpired part of the term of
the original patent. No new matter shall be introduced into the application for reissue.
Id.
28 The requirements for a patent application are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-15
(1994).
29 See HiLDRE'ra, supra note 18, at 4. The application must be sent to the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks in Washington, D.C. Id.
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). The specification must be "in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same." Id., 1.
31 See 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1994).
32 See 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1994). This requirement is rarely imposed except when the
invention is a composition of matter or when the examiner doubts the operability of the
invention, e.g., in the cases of a perpetual motion machine. See Al Lawrence Smith, Patent
Solicitation, in FUNDAmENTALS OF PATENT LAW AND PRACrICE 1993, at 25, 35 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study Series No. C805, 1993).
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
34 See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1994).
35 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 (1994). Claims were not required in patent applications until the
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198. Claims that are ambiguous or unduly broad
will be ruled invalid in an infringement suit. See HARMON, supra note 18, § 5.4, at 157.
However, claims that appear to be ambiguous will, whenever possible, be construed to
preserve their validity. See id. at 157 n.124.
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the part of any resulting patent that give the inventor his or her legal
rights against infringers.36
An invention must be new,37 useful, 38 and unobvious39 when compared to
the prior art4° in order to be patentable. A delay in filing a patent application
can result in a loss of patent rights.41 In addition, patentability is limited by
certain other restrictions. For example, laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas cannot be patented.42
After the inventor files a patent application, a patent examiner at the Patent
and Trademark Office determines whether or not the application is in condition
for allowance.43 If the examiner allows the application, then the inventor is
granted a patent44 after (surprise) payment of another fee.45 If the examiner
rejects the application, then the applicant can reply to the rejection by timely
36 See infra Part II.C.2.
37 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1994). Section 101 actually states that the invention must
be new, while the novelty requirement of § 102 qualifies § 101. An invention is not novel if it
"was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent." 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). An invention also is not novel if it "was described in a patent
granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another who has
fulfilled [certain statutory requirements] before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent." 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). When there has been a "complete anticipation" of the
invention, it is not technically "new" and thus cannot be patented. See HiLDRErI, supra note
18, at 55-57. "Tlhat which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier than
the date of invention." Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir.
1987); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). See infra Part II.C.2 for more on infringement.
38 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
39 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
40 The prior art includes any relevant knowledge, acts, descriptions, and patents that
pertain to, but predate, the invention. See BLACK'S LAw DICnoNARY 1193 (6th ed. 1990).
41 A patent will not issue if "the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States." 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). This restriction is called a "statutory bar." See HARMON, supra note 18, § 3.5, at
89.
42 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); see also
HARMON, supra note 18, §§ 2.1-2.2, at 33-43.
43 See HnDREmT, supra note 18, at 30-31. A patent application is in condition for
allowance if it meets all of the requirements for a patent to issue. See id.
44 See id.
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
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submitting a written amendment46 to the application.47 If the patent is allowed,
the specification (including the claims) and drawings of the application become
the specification and drawings of the patent.48 This entire process, from the
filing of the application to the allowance of the patent, is called the prosecution
of the patent application.49 The record of all of these proceedings forms the
prosecution history.50
46 See HurDprm1, supra note 18, at 30-31, 190.
4 7 See id. at 30-31. The applicant can not add any new matter to the specification or the
claims in the amendment. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994) ("No amendment shall introduce new
matter into the disclosure of the invention."). Within this limitation, the applicant can cancel,
add, or rewrite the claims. See HLDRErm, supra note 18, at 190. The applicant can agree
with the examiner's objections or argue that the examiner's reasoning is flawed. See id.
The applicant can also have a limited number of personal interviews with the examiner
regarding the objections. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133 (1996). Regardless of whether an agreement
is reached between the examiner and applicant at the interview, however, "[a] complete
written statement as to the substance of any face-to-face or telephone interview with regard to
the merits of an application must be made of record in the application." MANuAL OF PAnNT
EXAmaiNG PRocEmrn, § 713.04, at 700-107 (1995); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.133. The
applicant, or the applicant's agent or attorney, has the "responsibility... to make the
substance of an interview of record in the application file, unless the examiner indicates he or
she will do so." 37 C.F.R. § 1.133. In this regard, the form that the examiner uses to record
the substance of the interview, Form PTOL 413, includes a box that the examiner can check
to indicate that "the applicant need not supplement the Form by submiuing a separate record
of the interview." Id.
The amendment and rejection process is repeated until either the application is allowed
or the examiner issues a "final rejection." After a final rejection, the applicant may have the
opportunity to file an "amendment after final rejection" to cancel claims or to comply with the
examiner's objections. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 (1996). If the application is rejected again or if
the examiner refuses to accept the amendment, the applicant can appeal to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences. See HnDREm, supra note 18, at 31-32. From there, the applicant
can appeal to either the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. See id. Any ruling from the district court can be appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See id. An applicant can appeal an adverse decision thereby
petitioning the United States Supreme Court. See id.
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)(4) (1994). The patent also has various other contents, such
as the title of the invention and the grant of the patent to the patentee, his heirs, or assigns.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
49 See HILRDPT-, supra note 18, at 30-32.
50 The prosecution history is the record kept by the Patent and Trademark Office of the
prosecution of a patent application. See 4 CHmSuM, supra note 18, § 18.05, at 18-151. The
prosecution history can also be referred to as the "file wrapper." See id. The specification,
claims, and prosecution history become part of the public record. See Southwall Tech., Inc.
v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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2. Infringement
A patent grants the holder the "right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States."' 51 Subject to maintenance
fees,52 this right lasts for twenty years from the date on which the patent
application was filed in the United States. 53 When a person makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention without permission, that person is liable
to the patent holder for infringement.54 The infringer may be liable for up to
three times any actual damages, and in "exceptional cases," for attorney's
fees. 55 The infringer may also be enjoined from performing further acts of
infringement. 56
Infringement analysis has two steps. 57 First, the scope and meaning of the
allegedly infringed claim (or claims) must be determined. 58 The claim is
construed in light of three factors: (1) the language of the claims, (2) the
specification, and (3) the prosecution history. 59 The words of a claim are
presumed to have their "ordinary and accustomed meaning" unless the
specification or file history indicates that the inventor intended otherwise. 60
51 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
52 See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (1994).
53 See 35 U.S.C. § 154. On December 8, 1994, the patent term was changed from the
previous 17 year term from the date of issue to the current 20 year term from the date of
filing. This change was made in accordance with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
Treaty (GATT). See Pub. L. 103-465, Title V, § 532(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4983, 4990.
54 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
55 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-85 (1994); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp.,
72 F.3d 1577, 1579, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d
785,792 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
56 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994).
57 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
58 See id. Note that the claims are what are allegedly infringed, not the specification.
59 See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Carrol Touch,
Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
60 See Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1943), af'd, 322
U.S. 471 (1944)). In order to allow an inventor to have the flexibility necessary to describe
new things, the inventor can give words new meanings that are different than their ordinary
and accustomed ones. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl.
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Extrinsic evidence, such as the testimony of experts, can also be used "to aid
the court in the construction of the patent."'61 Second, the allegedly infringing
device is compared to the properly construed claim.62 The first step is often
more important because a claim's construction is often determinative as to
whether the claim is infringed. 63
1967), cited in United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
"[Platent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.... The sanction of [the
creation of] new words or hybrids from old ones not only leaves one unsure what a rose is,
but also unsure whether a rose is a rose." Id.
61 Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41 (1875); see also United Carbon Co. v. Binney
& Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233 (1942); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 545-
46(1870).
62 See Read, 970 F.2d at 821. If the accused device embodies each and every limitation
of the properly construed claim, then the device "literally infringes" the claim. See Baxter
Healthcare Corp. v. Specramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Johnston v.
IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In order to prevent "the pirating of the
patentee's invention in the absence of literal infringement when liability is nevertheless
warranted," the courts have developed the "doctrine of equivalents." Miles Labs., Inc. v.
Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Hormone Res. Found., Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). At the time that Markman was
decided, "[i]nfringement under the doctrine of equivalents require[d] a showing that the
accused device perform[ed] substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same result as the patented device." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). "The essence of this doctrine is that one
may not practice fraud on a patent." Id.; see also Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952
F.2d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
After Marknan, another case restated the test: "With this case, this court explicitly holds
that the application of the doctrine of equivalents rests on the substantiability of the differences
between the claimed and accused products or processes, assessed according to an objective
standard." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir.
1995). "[E]valuation of function, way, and result does not necessarily end the inquiry." Id.
63 See HARmON, supra note 18, §§ 5.6, 6.1, 6.2 (a)(ii).
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Patent infringement is essentially a tort.64 Direct infringement65 requires
neither intent nor knowledge. 66 The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over all patent litigation, including infringement actions. 67 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit68 has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in all
patent cases. 69
64 See Ortholinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (stating
that "[finfringement ... is essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the
patentee").
65 Patent infringement comes in three flavors: direct infringement, contributory
infringement, and inducement to infringe. Direct infringement is the actual commission of one
of the acts specified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (i.e., making, using, offering to sell, or selling any
patented invention without permission). Contributory infringement involves the knowing
importation of something especially made or especially adapted for use in the infringement of
a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994). Inducement to infringe is the active inducement of
another to infringe a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). The liability is the same for any of these
types of infringement. See id.; HARMON, supra note 18, § 6.4. Unless otherwise specified,
infringement as used here generally means direct infringement.
66 See HARMON, supra note 18, § 6.2(a)(i); see also Texas Instruments v. International
Trade Comm'n 988 F.2d 1165, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Intel Corp. v. United States
ITC, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
The question [of infringement] is one irrespective of motive. The defendant may have
infringed without intending, or even knowing it; but he is not, on that account, the less
of an infringer. His motives and knowledge may affect the question of damages, to swell
or reduce them; but the immediate question is the simple one, has he infringed?
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849)
(No. 10,740)).
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent ... cases." Id.
68 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts
Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25 (codified at various
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994). In other words, the Federal Circuit has national




A. The '054 Patent7 o
Markman's '054 patent was for an inventory tracking system for dry-
cleaning stores. Claims 171 and 1072 were allegedly infringed. Because claim
10 was dependent upon claim 1, a device that did not infringe claim 1 could not
infringe claim 10.7 3 Because neither the district court nor the Federal Circuit
found claim 1 to be infringed, only claim 1 needs to be analyzed here.
70 See supra note 2.
71 Claim 1 recites:
The inventory control and reporting system, comprising a data input device for manual
operation by an attendant, the input device having switch means operable to encode
information relating to sequential transactions, each of the transactions having articles
associated therewith, said information including transaction identity and descriptions of
each of said articles associated with the transactions; a data processor including memory
operable to record said information and means to maintain an inventory total, said data
processor having means to associate sequential transactions with unique sequential
indicia and to generate at least one report of said total and said transactions, the unique
sequential indicia and the descriptions of articles in the sequential transactions being
reconcilable against one another;
a dot matrix printer operable under control of the data processor to generate a written
record of the indicia associated with sequential transactions, the written record including
optically-detectable bar codes having a series of contrasting space bands, the bar codes
being printed only in coincidence with each said transaction and at least part of the
written record bearing a portion to be attached to said articles; and,
at least one optical scanner connected to the data processor and operable to detect said
bar codes on all articles passing a predetermined station,
whereby said system can detect and localize spurious additions to inventory as well as
spurious deletions therefrom.
The '054 patent, supra note 2, claim 1 (emphasis added).
72 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
73 A dependent claim is one which refers to a preceding claim for part of its subject
matter. See 1 ANTiONYW. DEL..R, PATENT CLAM § 144 (2d ed. 1971). For example, let
independent claim X be "a machine comprising A, B, and C." Let dependent claim Y be "the
machine of claim X further comprising D." Claim Y is effectively the same as "a machine
comprising A, B, C, and D." See id. If an allegedly infringing device does not have an
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B. The Parties' Constructions of Claim 1
The only disputed term in the construction of claim 1 of the '054 patent was
the term "inventory." 74
1. Markman 's Position
Markman's position was that the term "inventory" was not limited to
articles of clothing.7 5 Markman argued that inventory could refer exclusively to
cash or invoice totals. 76 Markman supported this view at trial with the
testimony of three witnesses.77
Under Markman's construction of claim 1, Westview's DATAMARK and
DATASCAN devices78 literally infringed the '054 patent.79 Markman
element of the independent claim, say B, then it cannot have all of the elements of the
dependent claim. For this reason, "[o]ne who does not infringe an independent claim cannot
infringe a claim dependent on (and thus containing all the limitations of) that claim."
Wahpeton Canvas Co., v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9 (citing Teledyne
McCormick Selph v. United States, 558 F.2d 1000, 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1977)). The word
"comprising" is a term of art used in "open" claims. See HARMON, supra note 18, § 5.6, at
172. An open claims can be infringed by a device that has elements in addition to those listed
in the claim. For example, a claim for a device "comprising A, B, and C" can be infringed
by a device that not only has A, B, and C, but also D, E, F, and any other elements. See
ln. Erm, supra note 18, at 183-84.
7 4 See Martanan, 52 F.3d at 974.
7 5 See id.
7 6 See id.
7 7 See id. at 973. Markman called an expert on bar-code technology (which is used by
the patented invention), himself as the inventor, and a "patent expert" (a practicing patent
attorney). See id. at 980. This type of testimony is "extrinsic evidence" for claim
construction. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
7 8 Westview's DATAMARK and DATASCAN devices, like the device patented in the
'054 patent, are used in drycleaning stores. The DATAMARK is a stationary unit used to
print bar codes about customers, the clothes they need cleaned, and the charges for the
cleaning. The DATAMARK retains an invoice list consisting of the invoice numbers, dates,
and cash totals (but not the types of articles of clothing) in memory. See Marlkan, 52 F.3d at
972-73.
The DATASCAN is a portable unit. After the invoice list from the DATAMARK is
transferred to the DATASCAN, the DATASCAN is carried about to read the bar codes for
the articles of clothing. The DATASCAN compares the bar codes to the invoice list and
identifies discrepancies. See id.
7 9 See Markinan v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536-37 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
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contended that each and every limitation disclosed in claim 1 was present in
Westview's devices. 80
2. Westview's Position
Westview's position was that inventory meant "articles of clothing." 81
Westview argued that the plain language of the claim, the specification, and the
prosecution history all indicated that inventory could not mean just cash or
invoice totals.82
Under Westview's construction of the '054 patent, the DATAMARK and
DATASCAN devices did not infringe the patent. 83 Westview's devices lacked a
limitation recited in claim 1, namely the "means to maintain an inventory
total." 84 Because Westview's devices lacked an essential part of the claimed
invention, the devices could not infringe literally. 85 Moreover, because
Westview's devices could not track articles of clothing, Westview's devices did
not operate in substantially the same way as the '054 patent's device. 86




In the trial, Westview moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of
Markman's case in chief.88 The judge deferred the motion until after the trial.89
The jury found in Markman's favor, 9° ruling that inventory could simply be
80 See id.
81 See Maranan, 52 F.3d at 974.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 973-74.
85 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
86 See Marlinan, 52 F.3d at 975 n.4. Markman's device detects spurious additions and
deletions for inventory by tracking articles of clothing. See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
87 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
88 See Marmnan, 772 F. Supp. at 1536. "Directed verdict" has since been renamed
"judgment as a matter of law." See FED. R. Civ. P. 50. It is referred to throughout the
appellate decision by the latter term. See Marlanan, 52 F.3d at 973 n.2.
89 SeeMarlanan, 52 F.3d at 973.
90 See id.
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cash or invoice totals. Therefore, the jury ruled that Westview's devices
infringed claims 1 and 10 of the '054 patent. 91
After the jury reached its verdict, the district court judge ruled on the
deferred motion. 92 First, the judge ruled that the first part of infringement
analysis, construing the claims, 93 is a question of law solely for the court.94 The
judge then ruled that, as a matter of law, inventory meant articles of clothing
and not simply cash or invoice totals. 95 Accordingly, the judge set aside the
jury's verdict and ruled that Westview's devices did not infringe the '054
patent.96
2. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The following analysis of the Federal Circuit's ruling is fairly detailed. This
level of detail may at first seem inappropriate in light of the fact that the
Supreme Court has spoken on the matter.97 However, in the case of patent law,
Federal Circuit opinions have traditionally carried inordinate weight. This is
partly because Federal Circuit rulings have nationwide effect. 98 In addition,
while the Federal Circuit has "interpreted" certain Supreme Court decisions so
as to effectively negate them, 99 the Supreme Court has only rarely reversed the
Federal Circuit in the area of substantive patent law. 100
91 See id.
92 See id.; Maranan, 772 F. Supp. at 1536.
93 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
94 See Marlanan, 52 F.3d at 973; Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1536. The various
justifications for this ruling form the heart of this Case Comment. See infra Parts V, VI, and
VII. This ruling means that the interpretation of the meanings of terms used in the claims (the
"claim language") is also a matter of law solely for the court. See id.
95 SeeMarkman, 52 F.3d at 973; Markman, 772 F. Supp. at 1537.
96 See Maranan, 52 F.3d at 973; Maranan, 772 F. Supp. at 1536.
97 See infra Part II.C.3.
98 See supra note 5.
99 See, e.g., Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove an
Antitrust Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 12 (stating that the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing,
Int'l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 828 F.2d 755 (1987), "ignored clear Supreme Court precedent");
Edmund J. Sease, The Federal Circuit's Short Circuit of Validity Challenges: Or, Is the Spirit
of Lear Dead?, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 229, 238 (1988-89) (stating that "the Federal Circuit
... ignored the expressed public policy of Lear v. Adkins[, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)], though it
was reiterated by the Supreme Court in [two subsequent cases]"); Frank S. Molinaro, Note,
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.-The Federal Circuit Redefines the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 787, 789 (1989) (stating that the Federal Circuit in
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court. 10 1 The first
issue for the Federal Circuit was what standard to apply for reviewing the
district court's ruling. 102 If the interpretation of claim language was an issue of
fact, then the jury's verdict required significant deference. 10 3 In that case, the
district court's judgment as a matter of law could stand only if no "substantial
evidence... support[ed] a finding in favor of the nonmovant." 104 If the
interpretation of claim language was an issue of law for the court, then the
Federal Circuit would have had to examine the district court's judgment de
novo.10 5 The jury's determination would receive little deference.
The majority ruled that the interpretation of claim language is a matter of
law solely for the court. 106 First, the majority reviewed the precedent in this
Pennwalt, 833 F.2d 931 (1987), "in essence overrule[d] a United States Supreme Court
precedent").
10 To the author's knowledge, the only time that the Supreme Court has overruled the
Federal Circuit on a substantive patent law issue was when the patentability of algorithms was
at issue. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 97, 106 n.39 (1993) (observing that "the Supreme Court
consistently reversed the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit... on the issue of
patentabilty of algorithms."). Note that even this line of reversals eventually ended. See
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
The Supreme Court has shown a greater propensity to overrule the Federal Circuit when
matters other than substantive patent law are at issue. See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 115 S. Ct. 788 (1995) (dealing with the Plant Variety Protection Act); Cardinal
Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993) (holding that affirmation by the Federal
Circuit of noninfringement is not per se sufficient reason for vacating a declaratory judgment
of patent invalidity, which had been the Federal Circuit's practice); Panduit Corp. v.
Dennison Mfg. Co., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (holding that the Federal Circuit failed to comply
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827 (1990) (concerning interest on damages); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (concerning jurisdiction); United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64
(1987) (same).
101 See Markanan, 52 F.3d at 968.
102 See id. at 975.
10 3 See id. (citing Read Corp. v. Protec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
104 Id. at 975 (citing Read Corp. 970 F.2d at 821); see also Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986); cf Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
105 See Madanan, 52 F.3d at 975 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984); Bradley v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 991 F.2d 1570, 1574 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153,
1158 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
106 See Marknan, 52 F.3d at 979.
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area.'0 7 After noting that the Federal Circuit's own precedent was split,108 the
majority found that the Supreme Court's precedent supported interpretation of
claim language as a matter of law. 109 Next, the majority noted that "[i]t has
long been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American law that
'the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court." ' 110 The
majority stated that, because a "patent is a fully integrated written
instrument,"111 it is "uniquely suited for having its meaning and scope
determined entirely by a court as a matter of law." 112
The majority reviewed the concurrences and the dissent and found that the
Seventh Amendment did not mandate any role for juries in the interpretation of
claim language. 113 The majority discussed an analogy made in both Judge
Mayer's concurrence and Judge Newman's dissent. This analogy was between
interpreting claim language and construing and interpreting contracts, deeds,
and wills. 114 The majority found this analogy wanting. 115 Instead, the majority
analogized the interpretation of claim language to the interpretation of terms in
statutory construction, reasoning that patents are more like statutes than
contracts. 116 Whereas contracts require the consent of the parties and are
107 See id. at 976-79; see infra Part V.
1O8 See Maronn, 52 F.3d at 976-77.
109 See id. at 977.
110 Id. at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) and citing
Eddy v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 165 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[A]ppellate courts have
untrammelled power to interpret written documents")); see also 4 SAMUEL WIuSToN,
WiLSTON ON CONTRACrS § 601, at 303 (3d ed. 1961).
111Marlana, 52 F.3d at 978.
1 12 Id. (citing Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878)).
113 See id. at 984.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 985-87. The majority stated:
The analogy of a patent to a contract is not useful ... in the context of a patent
infringement suit. Patents are not contracts per se and patent infringement actions have
never been viewed as breach of contract actions.... The [alleged infringer] is never a
party to the so-called "contract" between the government and the inventor [for the
patent].
Id. at 985 (citing Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 279 (1877)).
116 See id. at 987. The author contends that the analogy between patents and statutes
provides the key to analyzing the constitutional issues involved in deciding if a jury must
interpret claim language in patent infringement suits. However, the author believes that the
Federal Circuit did not adequately recognize the flaws in this analogy and, therefore, failed to
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executory in nature (both parties must do something), patents do not require the
consent of an infringer and are not executory in nature. 17 The majority also
stated:
[B]ecause both... [statutes and patents] may create liability in third persons
who were not participants in the legislative process or the PTO proceedings, as
the case may be, we conclude that the statutory interpretation model is a more
accurate model than the contractual one for purposes of determining whether
constitutional protections are transgressed by assigning claim construction
exclusively to judges. 118
The court noted that a judge could still turn to extrinsic evidence when
interpreting claim language."19 However, a judge would not be using the
extrinsic evidence to resolve an ambiguity in the claim language. Such
ambiguities, if truly present, would render the claim invalid.120 Instead, the
extrinsic evidence would be used "to inform the court about the language [(i.e.,
the technical terminology and jargon)] in which the patent [claim] is
written."121
After determining that the meaning of claim language was a matter of law
solely for the court, the majority construed the claim de novo. 122 The majority
reached the same conclusion as the district court judge:123 The term inventory,
in light of the plain language of the specification (including the claims) and the
prosecution history, clearly meant article of clothing. 124 Therefore, Westview's
devices, which did not keep track of the articles of clothing, did not infringe.' 25
realize that factual situations can arise where the jury should settle issues that can be involved
in claim language interpretation. See infra Part VIII.B.
117 See Markan, 52 F.3d at 985-87.
118 Id. at987.
119 See id. at 986.
120 See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); supra note 35 and accompanying text.
121 Mark , 52 F.3d at 986.
122 See id. at 988.
123 See id. at 982, 988-89; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp.
1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991); see also supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
124 See Markan, 52 F.3d at 982.
125 See id. at 988-89.
In a concurrence, Judge Mayer argued that the majority "jettison[ed] more than two
hundred years of jurisprudence and eviscerate[dJ the role of the jury preserved by the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring). He
stated: "Contrary to what it says today, this court (including the judges in the majority) has
always held that claim interpretation is a matter of law depending on underlying factual
inquiries." Id. (Mayer, J., concurring). Judge Mayer went on to state that "sometimes
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In a thorough dissent, Judge Newman stated that the majority's ruling
"creates a litigation system that is unique to patent cases, unworkable, and
ultimately unjust." 126 Judge Newman argued that the majority was usurping the
jury's role in patent suits, using the "classification power"12 7 of appellate courts
to turn issues of fact into matters of law.' 28 Judge Newman also put forth an in-
depth discussion of the Seventh Amendment, finding that the Constitution
required a jury to settle underlying factual issues in claim construction.' 29
Finally, Judge Newman argued that the precedent supported jury determination
of underlying factual issues.' 3 0 Judge Newman would have remanded the case
back to the district court to determine "whether there was substantial credible
evidence of such quality and weight that a reasonable jury could have reached
the verdict that was reached by [the district court's] jury."' 13 1
extrinsic evidence results in a genuine dispute over the meaning of a term or an event during
prosecution. When this happens, it falls to the finder of fact to settle it." Id. at 991 (Mayer,
J., concurring) (footnote omitted). He proceeded to argue that the Seventh Amendment
guaranteed this role for the jury. See id. at 992-93 (Mayer, J., concurring). To the extent that
disputes regarding what happened during prosecution should remain the purview of the jury in
the absence of an adequate written record, this Case Comment agrees with Judge Mayer's
opinion. See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
In another concurrence, Judge Rader stated that the "court need not [have] decide[d]
whether subsidiary fact issues may sometimes arise" in claim construction in order to have
decided the case. Markm, 52 F.3d at 998 (Rader, J., concurring). Judge Rader went on to
state that the "court's extensive examination of subsidiary fact issues [was] dicta." Id. (Rader,
J., concurring). He argued that no substantial evidence supported the jury's finding in the
district court. See id. (Rader, J., concurring). Therefore, the district court judge was correct
in granting judgment as a matter of law that Westview did not infringe. See id. at 998-99
(Rader, J., concurring).
12 6 Id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting).
127 Judge Newman stated: "Commentators have remarked on the temptation of appellate
courts to redefine questions of fact as questions of law in order to impose the court's policy
viewpoint on the decision." Id. at 1008 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Martin B. Louis,
Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A
Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64
N.C. L. REv. 993, 1018 (1986)).
128 See id. at 1008-10 (Newman, J., dissenting).
12 9 See id. at 1010-17 (Newman, J., dissenting).
130 See id. at 1017-25 (Newman, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 1026 (Newman, j., dissenting).
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3. United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit's ruling. 132
The Court stated that "there is no dispute that [patent] infringement cases today
must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries
ago."1 33 The Court went on to state that the real question was "whether a
particular issue occurring within a jury trial (here the construction of a patent
claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue, the guarantee [of having a jury decide
that issue] being essential to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the
ultimate dispute. 2134
In order to answer the question, the Court first looked at historical practice
and precedent. 135 After determining that history and precedent offered no clear
answers, the Court looked to functional considerations. 136 The Court noted that
"[t]he construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often
do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in
exegesis.,,137 Finally, the Court stated that it saw "the importance of uniformity
in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues
of [claim] construction to the Court." 138 Interestingly, the Court did not pursue
the analogies between patents, contracts, and statutes made by the Federal
Circuit.139
IV. RAMIFICATIONS
A. Claim Language Interpreted by Judges
Under Markman, patent claim language is interpreted by judges. 140 Patent
claims can contain some of the most obtuse and difficult to understand language
132 See Makman, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996).
133 Id. at 1389.
134 Id.
135 See id. at 1390-95.
136 See id. at 1395.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1396. This "uniform treatment" has to do with the precedential value of claim
language construction once a claim has been interpreted by the Federal Circuit. See infra Part
Iv.C.
139 As mentioned supra note 116, the author believes that understanding these analogies
is the key to making a proper determination of what issues should remain for the jury. See
infra Part VIII.
140 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Under Markman, the interpretation of
claim language is a matter of law solely for the court. See Marbnan, 116 S. Ct. at 1387.
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found anywhere in the law. 141 Judges, who have experience in analyzing
complex contracts and statutes, should have an advantage over juries in
analyzing this language. 142 This ramification has been suggested as a reason in
and of itself for excluding juries from patent suits. 143 The debate about such
"complexity exceptions" to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial started
well before the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman.144 The Federal Circuit,
however, has explicitly stated that it will not create a complexity exception to
the Seventh Amendment. 145
B. Impact on Litigators
Because a judge interprets claim language under Markman, patent litigators
must tailor their cases accordingly. For example, jury instructions should no
longer inform a jury about how to determine the meanings of terms used in
claims. Instead, jury instructions should set forth the court's interpretations of
Questions of law are, of course, decided by judges. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
141 See HARMON, supra note 18, § 1.1(b), at 7. "[flt has been well said that the claims
of a patent constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw." Id. (citing Laitram
Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v.
Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
142 Some empirical research suggests that this argument may not be valid. See Stephen
B. Judlowe & Lee A. Goldberg, Jury Trials, in PATENT LImGATioN 1994, at 173 (PLI Pat.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 397, 1994). "In a
recent three year study by the American Bar Association's Section on Litigation, it was
concluded that juries in complex cases, including those involving high technology, reached
verdicts consistent with the trial judge's own opinion of the evidence." Id.; see also SRI Int'l
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1128 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (arguing that
any judge would have a hard time matching the combined intelligence and experience of a
diverse jury).
143 See Judlowe & Goldberg, supra note 142, at 173.
144 See, e.g., Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA 77 (1994); Steven W.
Davis, Clash Between Due Process and the Right to Trial by Jury in Compler Litigation, 35
U. MIAM L. REv. 164 (1980); Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh
Amendnent Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 581 (1984).
145 See SRI, 775 F.2d at 1130. In his concurrence, Judge Mayer argued that the
Mark nan decision threatens to do just that. See Markan, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J.,
concurring). The only circuit to recognize a complexity exception is the Third Circuit. See In
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980). In addition to
the Federal Circuit, other circuits have explicitly rejected a complexity exception. See, e.g.,
In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411,431 (9th Cir. 1979).
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the terms (and of the overall claims). 146 Litigators also have to re-evaluate how
they utilize expert witnesses. Before Markman, an expert would offer an
opinion as to infringement or the meaning of the claim language, and the jury
would weigh the expert's testimony against other evidence. 147 Under Markman,
the court can consider expert testimony. 148 However, the court need not hear
expert testimony, 149 and the expert is "entitled to no deference." 150
Procedurally, motions for summary judgment may become more common,
especially when cases turn on claim construction. 151 In addition, the prudent
litigator should view "discovery motions, status reports, motions in limine and
proposed jury charges [as integral parts of] an overall program to educate the
court." 152 In order to allow the parties to educate the district court judge, the
actual procedure of an infringement suit may change. A preliminary hearing
146 See Mark A. Flagel et al., An Assortnment of Jury Instuctions for Patent Cases, in
TRIAL OFAPATENT CASE 155, 163-66 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Series No. CA42, 1995).
147 See William F. Lee & Wayne L. Stoner, The Role of Expert Witnesses on Liability
Issues in Patent Litigation in Light of Markman v. Westview Instruments, in PATENT
I.rGAnoN 1995, at 647 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 423, 1995).
14 8 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1394-95 (1996)
(quoting 2 WKUAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 732, at
481-83 (1890)) [hereinafter ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS]. The Federal Circuit perhaps states
the rule best: "The court may, in its discretion, receive extrinsic evidence in order 'to aid the
court in coming to a correct conclusion' as to the 'true meaning of the language employed' in
the patent." Marmnan, 52 F.3d at 980 (citing Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516,
546 (1871)). Extrinsic evidence includes expert testimony. See id.
149 Note the phrasing of the Court: "The court may, in its discretion receive extrinsic
evidence... ." Mar/anan, 52 F.3d at 980 (emphasis added).
150 See id. at 983. Because claim construction is a question of law, an expert's opinion
as to claim construction is a legal opinion that the court is free to ignore. The court held that
"as to these types of opinions, the court has complete discretion to adopt the expert legal
opinion as its own, to find guidance from it, or to ignore it entirely, or even to exclude it." Id.
Stated differently, "in the actual interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon its own
responsibility." Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395 (quoting 2 ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS, supra
note 148, § 732, at 481-83 (1890)).
151 See Brian Michael Martin, Federal Circuit Limits Jury's Role in Patent Trials, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 641, 648 (1995). This will be especially true in cases where
the claim language has already been interpreted by the Federal Circuit in a prior suit. The
Federal Circuit's interpretation would be binding precedent for the district court, in effect
mandating how the district court should rule. See also infra Part IV.C.
152 Martin, supra note 151, at 648.
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that allows the judge to interpret claim language and construe claims up front
may become commonplace.' 5 3
C. Precedential Value of Claim Language Interpretation
Because the Federal Circuit hears all patent appeals, 154 the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of claim language becomes binding precedent for all
district courts across the nation. As a result, a claim that has been construed on
appeal has a uniform and fixed meaning in any subsequent infringement action
anywhere in the United States.155 The patent holder knows what he holds, and
the rest of the world (or at least the nation) knows what they can or can not
make, use, or sell without the patent holder's permission. This knowledge
should allow for predictability and stability in the technological market place, 156
153 See, e.g., ELF Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp.
844, 850 (D. Del. 1995). In ELF, the judge held a bench trial at the start of a patent
infringement suit in order to determine the meaning of disputed claim language. See id. Judge
McKelvie scheduled two days for the hearing, which he called a "Marlanan Trial." See id.
Such hearings may become as common for patent infringement suits as preliminary hearings
are in suits where the admissibility of scientific evidence is in question. See, e.g., Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
154 See supra note 5.
155 Because of its national jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit's holdings have a similar
impact on district court cases as the Supreme Court's holdings did before the Federal Circuit
was established. In respect to the Supreme Court, Professor Robinson observed:
To treat the nature of the patented invention as a matter of fact, to be inquired of and
determined by a jury, would at once deprive the inventor of the opportunity to obtain a
permanent and universal definition of his rights under the patent, and in each case of
infringement it would subject him to the danger of false interpretation, from the
consequences of which he could not escape.... [W]hen his patent has received the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States the inventor can maintain his
privilege, as thus interpreted, against all opponents without further controversy in
reference to its true limitations.
2 ROBINsON, LAW OF PATEN'm, supra note 148, § 733, at 483-84 (1890), cited in Markan,
52 F.3d at 979.
156 Contrast this situation with the one where claim language interpretation is an issue of
fact. In that case, two juries for two different infringement actions could interpret the same
claim language in two different ways, leading to inconsistent or even contradictory claim
constructions. In addition, barring issue preclusion, a patent holder would be forced to
completely relitigate the interpretation of the claim language for each and every infringement
action for a patent.
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thereby promoting science and the useful arts. In other words, one impact of
the Markman ruling is the furtherance of the constitutionally mandated goal of
the entire patent system. 157
D. Standard of Review on Appeal
As demonstrated by this case, the standard of review on appeal for a district
court's claim language interpretation is de novo. 158 Arguably, this de novo
review perverts the roles of the trial and appellate courts, rendering the trial
moot.159 Resources permitting, whichever side loses at the district court level
will appeal to the Federal Circuit for a fresh chance to get the claim language
interpreted their way. Note, however, that such a situation is not really anything
new. The same scenario occurs whenever a district court construes a fully
integrated contract or a statute as a matter of law. The losing side always has
the opportunity to get the interpretation of the language of the integrated
contract or statute reviewed de novo, as these issues are also matters of law
solely for the courts. 16° In addition, numerous issues in infringement cases
relating to both liability and damages remain for juries under the Markman
ruling.
E. Remaining Factual Issues
Many issues in a patent infringement suit remain within the purview of the
jury after Markman. A few are listed here. This discussion is by no means all-
inclusive; the discussion is only meant to show that substantial issues do remain
for the jury.
First and foremost, the determination of whether the accused device
infringes the properly construed claims remains for the jury.161 This
157 See supra Part ll.B.
158 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
159 In fact, Judge Mayer argued that the majority's ruling upsets the role of the trial as
"the 'main event'... rather than a 'tryout on the road."' Marlnan, 52 F.3d at 991-92
(Mayer, J., concurring) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575
(1985)). In her dissent, Judge Newman repeatedly emphasizes her opinion that the majority's
ruling upsets the proper roles of trial and appellate courts. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 999,
1008-09, 1025-26 (Newman, J., dissenting).
160 See, e.g., William & James Brown & Co. v. McGran, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 479, 493
(1840); Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
161 See Marman, 52 P.3d at 984; see also Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730
F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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determination is the second key step in infringement analysis.' 62 In some cases,
this is a simple determination involving no genuine issue of fact, and the district
court can rule on the issue as a matter of law. 163 However, depending on the
precision of the district court judge's claim construction and on the precision of
the description of the allegedly infringing device, a genuine issue of fact may
still remain as to whether the device actually infringes the properly construed
claims.' 64 A finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 165 is also
a factual determination.1 66
Alleged infringers often assert that the patent at issue is invalid. The jury
may have to resolve numerous factual issues in this context. 167 In addition, after
a finding of validity and a subsequent finding of infringement, the jury may
have to determine whether the infringement was willful. 68 The determination
of willfulness is important because willful infringement can lead to treble
damages and the award of attorneys' fees.' 69 Finally, the determination of the
amount of damages is an issue for the jury. 170
V. PRECEDENT
An overview of the relevant precedent is in order. In the following
discussion, only the precedent from the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
162 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
163 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 988-89; Gentex Corp. v. Donnelly Corp., 69 F.3d 527,
530 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
164 This principle is illustrated in Johns Hopkins University v. Celopro, 894 F. Supp. 819
(D. Del. 1995).
165 See supra note 62.
166 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
167 A patent can be invalidated if the invention is anticipated by the prior art. See supra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Anticipation is an issue for the jury. See Continental Can
Co. USA, v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In addition, inequitable
conduct during prosecution before the Patent and Trademark Office can invalidate a patent.
See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945). The intent of the party that prosecuted the patent is central to a finding of
inequitable conduct and is an issue for the jury. See Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KIM
Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
168 See Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 791-92 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
169 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-85 (1994); King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,




is discussed.17 1 As is often the case when dealing with important issues,
precedent by itself is not dispositive.
A. United States Supreme Court
One of the more instructive Supreme Court cases to directly address the
law versus fact aspects of patent infringement is Winans v. Denmead.172 In that
case, the court stated:
Still the question must always be, whether, whatever the shape he [(the alleged
infringer)] adopts, he is not availing himself of the principle first suggested by
the patentee; a question which, in a court of law, is at all times a question not
for the court, but the jury; after the former [(the court)] shall have given to the
specification that construction which is to govern the latter [(the jury)] in
determining whether the infringement complained of falls, substantially, in
principle and mode of operation, within the plaintiff's patent.173
Winans's invention was a rail car for the transportation of coal.174 The rail
car was in the form of "a frustrum of a [circular] cone, substantially as herein
described, whereby the force exerted by the weight of the load presses equally
in all directions."1 75 The allegedly infringing rail car was in the shape of an
octagonal pyramid. 176
At first blush, this case seems to support the proposition that claim
construction is a question of law solely for the court. However, Winans was
decided in 1853, well before claims were required in patents. 177 Therefore,
saying that Winans stands for any proposition concerning claim construction is
171 Precedent from the various circuit courts of appeals from before the establishment of
the Federal Circuit is not reviewed. As will become apparent, the precedent from the
Supreme Court is sufficiently lacking and the precedent from the Federal Circuit is
sufficiently muddled to necessitate a deeper analysis of the policies and theories behind the
MarkTna ruling. See infra Parts V.A and V.B. Suffice it to say that bringing in all of the
various circuit courts would just muddy the waters further, to no avail.
172 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
173 Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
174 See id. at 331.
175 Id.
17 6 See id. at 332.
177 See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed 1952); supra note
35 and accompanying text.
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inaccurate. However, the specification for the patent at issue did include
language very similar to a claim.178
In addition, whether or not the Court in Winans actually defined the key
language in the patent is open to argument. The Court in Winans concluded
with a statement that a rail car, in order to infringe, "must be so near to a true
circle as substantially to embody the patentee's mode of operation, and thereby
attain the same kind of result as was reached by his invention."' 179 The Court
refused to state whether or not the allegedly infringing octagonal design met this
test, leaving that question for the jury.18 0 Arguably, the Court was construing
the language of the patent and leaving the comparison to the octagonal rail car
to the jury.18 1 However, as Judge Mayer stated in his Markman concurrence,
the Court in Winans may have been construing the language of the patent "in a
general manner," leaving it to the jury to "fill in the specifics.' 182
One other Supreme Court case, Bischoff v. Wethered, 183 stands out. The
Court in that case stated:
It is undoubtedly the common practice of the United States Circuit Courts,
in actions at law, on questions of priority of invention, where a patent under
consideration is attempted to be invalidated by a prior patent, to take the
evidence of experts as to the nature of the various mechanisms or manifactures
described in the different patents produced, and as to the identity184 or diversity
between them; and to submit all the evidence to the jury under general
instructions as to the rules by which they are to consider the evidence.... [I1n
all such cases the question [of identity] would... be treated as a question of
fact for the jury, and not as a question of law for the court. 185
On its face, this quote appears to be strong support for the position that
claim construction involves underlying factual determinations by a jury.
However, three points temper this conclusion. First, Bischoff was not a patent
178 See Winans, 56 U.S. at 331. The specification included this phrase: "What I claim as
my invention, and desire to secure by letters patent is .... Id.
179 Id. at 344.
180 See id.
181 Framed this way, Winans looks a lot like Maranan. The claim (or claim like
language) is construed as a matter of law, and the comparison of the allegedly infringing
device to the properly construed claim is an issue of fact. See supra notes 106, 140, 161, and
accompanying text.
182 See Marlanan, 52 F.3d at 995 (Mayer, J., concurring).
183 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869).
184 The key issue was whether or not a patent was identical to, and thus anticipated by,
another prior patent. See id. at 814. Note that this issue is not infringement.185 Id. at 814 (emphasis added) (footnote added).
[Vol. 58:271
M4RKMAN V WESTVIEW
infringement suit. Second, Bischoff was heard before passage of the Patent Act
of 1870, again well before claims were required in patents. 186 In fact, as the
Federal Circuit's majority in Markman noted, the word "claim" does not even
appear in the Bischoff opinion. 187 Third, the Court in Bischoff seemed to think
that hearing expert testimony (extrinsic evidence) and ruling on the
interpretation of patent language as a matter of law, were mutually exclusive. 188
As Markman demonstrates, though, these two activities can co-exist. 189
Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court cited numerous other
Supreme Court cases. 190 However, none of these are more enlightening than
Winans and Bischoff. In conclusion, the Supreme Court simply has never
stated, in the context of a modem patent infringement suit, whether the
interpretation of claim language is a matter of law or an issue of fact.
B. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit's majority admitted that the court's own precedent is
split. 191 The majority identified two main lines of cases, one holding that claim
construction (and thus the interpretation of claim language) is entirely a matter
of law and the other holding that claim construction "may have underlying
factual inquiries that must be submitted to the jury."192
In SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States International Trade
Commission,193 the Federal Circuit ruled that claim construction was entirely a
matter of law. 194 No mention of any underlying factual issue is made in SSIH.
A line of cases follows SSIh; none of those cases makes any mention of any
186 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
187 See Markinan, 52 F.3d at 988.
188 See Bischoff, 76 U.S. at 814-15. In justifying its ruling, the Court in Bischoff states:
"If the courts themselves were compellable to decide on these often recondite and difficult
questions, without the aid of scientific persons familiar with the subject of the inventions in
question, they might be led into irremediable errors, which would produce great injustice to
the suitors." Id. at 815 (emphasis added).
189 See, e.g., Markinan, 52 F.3d at 980; Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
190 See Marlanan, 116 S. Ct. at 1390-91, 93, 94 nn.12-13; Markznn, 52 F.3d at 977-
78; id. at 1021-25 (Newman, J., dissenting).
191 See Marlnanm, 52 F.3d at 976.
192 Id.
193 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
194 See id. at 376.
1997]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURATAL
underlying factual issues. 195 Of particular note is Specialty Composites v. Cabot
Corp., 196 which states that "[i]n reviewing the interpretation of the meaning of
claims, the reviewing court need not defer to the district court either under a
'clearly erroneous' standard or otherwise." 197
A second line of cases holds that claim construction is a question of law
with underlying factual issues. This line starts with McGill Inc. v. John Zink
Co.198 McGill states that "[i]f... the meaning of a term of art in the claims is
disputed and extrinsic evidence is needed to explain the meaning, construction
of the claims could be left to a jury." 199 However, in Envirotech Corp. v. Al
George, Inc.,200 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir 1984) the court never mentioned
extrinsic evidence in conjunction with claim construction.2 01 In fact, the court
in Envirotech expressly construed the claim 2°2 and then stated that it was up to
the jury to determine whether the defendant's apparatus infringed the claim.20 3
195 See, e.g., Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 818
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Construction of claim scope (claim interpretation) ... is a question of law
for decision by the trial judge on motion for JNOV and by this court on appeal."); SmithKline
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The claimed
invention must first be defined, a legal question of claim interpretation."); SRI Int'l v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Bandag, Inc. v. Al
Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding as a matter of law that
a claimed invention was a method); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 770-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Note that not all
these cases are mentioned in Marknan.
196 845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
197 Id. at 986 (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 866 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
198 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
199 Id. at 672 (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir.
1984). In the cases in this line, this statement is read as a command to leave such questions to
the jury. For a list of these cases, see infra note 204.
200 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir 1984).
201 See id. 753. The extrinsic evidence, expert testimony in this case, was instead
discussed with respect to the second part of infringement analysis, comparing the accused
device to the properly construed claim. See id. at 759-0.
202 See id. at 759.
203 See id. The court stated that "[t]he patented invention as indicated by the claims must
first be defined (a question of law), and then the trier must judge whether the claims cover the
accused advice (a question of fact)." Id. at 758. Note that this is the exact procedure that
should have been applied under Mar/onan.
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Numerous cases follow McGill's improper reading of precedent. 204 Thus,
one view of the "underlying factual issue" approach is that it is simply the
perpetuation of a misreading of precedent.
A subset of the line of cases that find underlying factual issues actually hold
a middle position. These cases state, in various terms, two propositions: (1)
claim construction is a matter of law, and (2) a dispute over the meaning of a
term within a claim does not necessarily create a genuine issue of fact.205 These
cases are interesting because they almost uniformly hold that judgment as a
matter of law is allowed despite actual disputes over the meanings of terms in
claims. The outcomes of these cases are generally the same as those from SSIH
and its line. The claims are construed as a matter of law, with no factual issues
for the jury. However, the language of these cases sounds more like that in the
cases that find underlying factual issues. The implication of the language is that
underlying factual issues can arise in claim construction.20 6
204 See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 952 F.2d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt Und Mktg. Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 1550 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir.
1987); H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1986); P.M. Palumbo v. Don-Joy
Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp.,
739 F.2d 604, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Note that not all these cases are mentioned in Markan.
205 See, e.g., Wolverine World Wide, Inc., v. Nike, Inc. 38 F.3d 1192, 1196-97 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 545-46 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Becton
Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Johnston v. IVAC
Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 814
F.2d 638, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987); George v. Honda Motor Co., 802 F.2d 432, 434 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Molinaro v. FannonfCourier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 654 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Federal
Circuit did not distinguish between the cases discussed supra notes 198-204 and these cases.
The distinction is somewhat ephemeral. The cases discussed supra notes 198-204 hold that
disputes over claim language are to be settled by the jury, while the cases in this middle line
hold that disputes over claim language are not necessarily for the jury.
206 Judge Rader's concurrence in the Federal Circuit opinion fits nicely with this line of
cases. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Racier, J., concurring). While Judge Rader argued that Maronan could be decided without
addressing the law versus fact status of claim construction, he did state that no actual factual
issue existed. See id. at 998 (Rader, J., concurring). He went on to state that "Markman
cannot manufacture a fact issue where none exists." Id. (Rader, J., concurring). Thus, Rader
argued that the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of Westview was proper
despite the dispute over the meaning of the term inventory. See id. at 998-99 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
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Two cases from this "middle of the road" group are particularly
instructive. The first one, Johnston v. IVAC Corp.,207 states that "a mere
dispute over the meaning of a term [in a claim] does not itself create an issue of
fact ... even where the meaning cannot be determined without resort to the
specification, the prosecution history or other extrinsic evidence." 20 8 This rule
is only a short step away from the Markman ruling. In Johnston, the court did
not find any issues of fact, despite having to look to the specification in order to
construct the claims.209
The second case, Howes v. Medical Components, Inc.,210 put forth the
same pair of propositions as the rest of the middle of the road cases: "Claim
construction is a question of law[,] and the mere existence of a dispute as to that
legal issue does not preclude summary judgment." 211 However, the court found
a material issue of fact in Howes.212 The court stated that "[fjrom the record, it
is impossible to tell what transpired during [an] interview [between the
examiner and Howes' attorney]-apparently only the examiner and Howes'
attorney were present. 213 The issue of what occurred during the prosecution,
the key issue in the case, was left to the jury.214
Howes presents a difficult dilemma for a court attempting to follow the
Markman ruling. When ruling on claim construction as a matter of law, the
court bases its construction on the ordinary meaning of the language in the
claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. 215 In a case such as
Howes, though, the prosecution history is not known-it is the very thing in
dispute. A court determining what events actually occurred in the past as a
matter of law without an adequate written record would be strange. In fact, this
type of issue-what to believe when people give an account of their past
actions-represents the archetype of a factual issue.216 However, for a court to
207 885 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
20 8 Id. at 1579.
209 See id. at 1580.
210 814 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
2 11 Id. at 643.
212 See id. at 645.
213 Id.
2 14 See id. at 646.
2 15 The court can also consider extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
2 16 The credibility of the person giving the account is not only a key factor in this type of
situation, it may be the only significant factor. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 603 (1961). The general rule is "that the question of the credibility of witnesses is one
for the jury alone." Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931). Note
that this credibility determination is conceptually different than when two experts are
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construe the claims solely as a matter of law in this type of case, the court
would have to rule on such a factual issue as a matter of law.
C. Conclusion
In general, the precedent is not dispositive. Neither the Supreme Court nor
the Federal Circuit has provided a clear standard for judging the Markman
ruling as a whole. Thus, in order to make a definitive judgment about
Markman, a deeper analysis of claim language interpretation is necessary.
VI. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit discussed the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.2 17 The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.218
Suits at common law include "suits in which legal rights [are] to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights
alone [are] recognized, and equitable remedies [are] administered." 219 The
right to a jury trial also extends to causes of action created by Congress.220
presenting conflicting opinions that they both believe to be true. In that situation, the judge is
deciding which expert is correct, not whether the expert is mistaken about or fabricating a
story concerning the occurrence of an event. As the Supreme Court stated the situation with
respect to experts, "[A]ny credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily
sophisticated analysis of the whole document." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116
S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996).
2 17 See Madanan, 116 S. Ct. at 1389-93; Ma,*ma, 52 F.2d at 983-84; id. at 992-93
(Mayer, J., concurring); id. at 1010-17 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also supra Part III.C.2
to.3.
218 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Note that the right is preserved. In other words, the
Seventh Amendment guarantees the same right to a jury trial as existed in the late eighteenth
century. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987).
2 19 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
220 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 417. Patent infringement is a case of action created by
Congress. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
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The actual issue here is not whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees
the right to a jury trial in patent infringement suits. Instead, the issue is whether
a Seventh Amendment right to a jury interpretation of claim language exists.221
A. The Tests
The determination of whether the right to a jury trial exists under the
Seventh Amendment involves two tests. "First, [the court] compare[s] the
statutory action to eighteenth-century actions brought in the courts of England
prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, [the court]
examine[s] the remedy sought and determine[s] whether it is legal or equitable
in nature." 2 22 At trial, the second test is the more compelling of the two.22
3
1. The Historical Test
The historical test involves comparing the issue in question to English law
in the eighteenth century. In England at that time, "most patent actions were
brought under the legal action of trespass on the case and were tried to
juries." 224 Therefore, under this test, a right to a jury trial in patent
infringement suits exists. However, modem mandatory patent claims, and thus
modem claim language interpretation, did not exist in 1791.225
In order to determine the Seventh Amendment status of a cause of action
that did not exist in eighteenth century England, the Supreme Court in
Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Teny 226 looked to "an analogous cause of action
that existed in the eighteenth century." 227 Furthermore, the Court analogized a
221 See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970). "The Seventh Amendment
question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall
action." Id.222 See Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18 (citations omitted).
223 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).
224 R. William Ide, I, et al., Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson
Company, Inc., 3 FED. Cm. B.J. 357, 383 (1993) (citing Gould v. Rees, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
187 (1872)); see also Turrill v. Michigan S. R.R. Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 491 (1864);
Haussknecht v. Claypool, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 431 (1862); Teese v. Huntingdon, 64 U.S. (23
How.) 2 (1860); Chaffe v. Boston Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217 (1859); Hogg v.
Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437 (1848).225 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
226 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
227 Id. at 565-66. In Chauffeurs, the Court analogized an action "for breach of a union's
duty of fair representation" to an action "by a trust beneficiary against a trustee for breach of
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single issue in Chauffeurs to an eighteenth century issue. 228 Thus, in order to
settle the historical test, an analogy must be made between the interpretation of
claim language and the proper eighteenth century English issue.
In some cases, the interpretation of claim language can be analogized to a
dispute about the meaning of a term in a contract.229 If the dispute is caused by
a conflict in the evidence, the issue is analogous to an issue tried before a jury
in the eighteenth century. 230 Thus, under this analogy and in cases where
conflicting evidence creates a dispute in the interpretation of claim language, a
right to a jury interpretation of claim language exists.
Alternatively, the interpretation of claim language can be analogized to the
interpretation of language in a statute.231 The interpretation of a statute, a
question of law, is considered to be an issue that was for the courts in
eighteenth century England. 232 Therefore, under this second analogy, no right
fiduciary duty." Id. at 565-69. Note that collective bargaining, and thus unions, were illegal
under eighteenth century English law. See id. at 565-66.228 The court analogized an issue under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
cl. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185), to a breach of contract claim. See
Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 569-70.22 9 See infra Part VII.A.
230 See Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 569-70; see also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants
Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 292 (1922).
231 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
see also infra Part VII.B. Note that the Supreme Court did not pursue these analogies in
Marklnan.
232 This proposition is not as clear cut as it may at first appear. In Bushell's Case, 6
How St. Tr. 999 (1670), an English court ruled that a jury could not be fined for refusing to
follow another court's instructions, allowing the jury to disregard the other court's
determination of law in the case before it. The early American courts approved of this power,
called "jury nullification." For example, Chief Justice John Jay used the following jury
instruction in one of the first civil cases heard under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court:
It may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on
questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of
the court, to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law .... you have,
nevertheless, a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law
as well as the fact in controversy.
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794), cited in Noel Fidel, Preeminently a
Political Institution: The Right of Arizona Juries to Nuify the Law of Contributory
Negligence, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1991). However, in Sparf & Hansen v. United States,
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to a jury interpretation of claim language exists.233
Thus, in order to make a determination under the historical test, the proper
analogy must be chosen. Until an analogy is chosen, the character of the
interpretation of claim language under the historical test is an open question.234
2. The Remedy Test
Legal remedies indicate a right to a jury trial; equitable remedies do not.235
The remedies for patent infringement include damages236 (a legal remedy) and
permanent injunctions237 (an equitable remedy). Where both types of remedies
156 U.S. 51 (1895), the concept of jury nullification in the federal judiciary was rejected by
the Supreme Court:
Under any other system [than one where the jury has a duty to obey the court's
determination of the law], the courts, although established in order to declare the law,
would for every practical purpose be eliminated from our system of government as
instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of society and of individuals in their
essential rights. When that occurs our government will cease to be a government of
laws, and become a government of men.
Id. at 102-03. The Court stated that the concept of jury nullification was "founded on a
confusion between the ideas of power and right." Id. at 88 (emphasis omitted). Note that the
courts have been accused of "fierce resolution and deceptive ingenuity" in restricting jury
determination of law. See Marke DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52
HARV. L. REv. 582, 616 (1939).
The orthodox view of eighteenth century British law agrees with the power versus right
distinction: "It is probably the sound view, at common law, that this power of the jury in
criminal cases [to disregard the judge's instructions] does not and did not, in any distinct and
modem sense, import a right on their part to determine the law." JAMEs THAYER, A
PEIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoMMoN LAw 169, 256 (1898), cited in
Howe, supra, at 583. "Mhe traditional British proposition [is] that the jury's right to return a
general verdict in criminal cases gives it only a power, and not a moral or legal right to
determine the law upon their own initiative regardless of the court's instruction." Id. at 584.
233 Note that the jury is not rendered a nonentity by removing them from claim language
interpretation. Several key issues in an infringement suit (including the actual determination of
infringement) remain within the purview of the jury. See supra Part IV.E.
234 Patents are analogized to contracts and to statutes. See infra Part VII.
235 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
236 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
2 37 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994); see also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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exist, a right to a jury trial exists. 238 Thus, under this part of the inquiry, a right
to a jury trial in patent infringement suits exists. However, no remedy directly
results from the interpretation of claim language. Therefore, this test fails to




Both the historical test and the remedy test indicate that the Seventh
Amendment protects the right to a jury trial in patent infringement suits.
However, the remedy test does not indicate whether a right to a jury
interpretation of claim language exists. Without more analysis, the historical test
is also inconclusive. The historical test can be resolved only if the proper
analogy is drawn between the interpretation of claim language and an issue in
eighteenth century English law.
VII. PATENTS ANALOGIZED TO CONTRACTS AND STATUTES240
A. Patents as Contracts
A patent can be viewed as a contract between the government and an
inventor for the benefit of society. 24 1 The government gives the inventor the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell his invention; in return, the inventor
discloses the invention to the public, 2 42 thereby promoting the useful arts.243
238 "[If [a] legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the
legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact. The right cannot be
abridged by characterizing the legal claim as 'incidental' to the equitable relief sought."
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.11.239 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
240 The Supreme Court did not pursue this line of analysis. See generally Markman v.
Westview, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1384 (1996). While the Federal Circuit did discuss these
analogies, see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text, the Federal Circuit failed to
consider the full ramifications of the analysis. This resulted in a ruling that may be overbroad
in some situations. See infra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
241 See Marcyan v. Nissen Corp., 578 F. Supp. 485, 498 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (citing
Krupp A.G. v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 F. 588 (3d Cir. 1911); Catanzaro v. Masco Corp.,
423 F. Supp. 415, 431 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd., 575 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1978); HIntRETH,
supra note 18, at 1.
242 See HDREMr, supra note 18, at 1.
243 See supra Part II.A.
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While the contract analogy may be valid between a patentee and the
government, the analogy fails between a patentee and an alleged infringer. The
alleged infringer is not a party to the issue of the patent.244 No "meeting of
minds" exists between the patentee and the alleged infringer.245 In addition, the
intent of the alleged infringer is wholly irrelevant to a finding of
infringement. 246 Thus, an analogy between a patent and a contract is not proper
in the infringement context.247
B. Patents as Statutes
In many ways, patents are similar to statutes. "[B]oth of these public
instruments may create liability in third persons who were not participants in
the legislative process or the PTO proceedings. 248 In other words, both restrict
otherwise lawful activities. The specification and prosecution history of a patent
are somewhat analogous to the legislative history of a statute. They all are
public records that can be used to help understand the corresponding
instrument.249 In addition, extrinsic evidence can be used to explain the
language in each. 250 For these reasons, the analogy of a patent to a statute in
patent infringement cases is appropriate. However, the analogy is not perfect.
244 See Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Keystone
Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 279 (1877)).
245 "[A] contract is the concrete result of the meeting of the minds of the contracting
parties." Richmond & Allegheny R.R. Co. v. R.A. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U.S. 311,
314 (1898).
246 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Intent, in the form of willfulness, can
affect damages. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
247 Even if a patent could be considered an actual contract between a patentee and an
infringer, the patentee might not like the result. While this may lead to a conclusion that the
Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to jury interpretation of claim language, see supra
Part VI, another basic principle of contract law might obviate this right. This is the principle
that ambiguous language in contracts should be construed against the drafter. See, e.g.,
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995). Clearly, the
patentee is the drafter, so any ambiguity in the claim language that causes a factual dispute
would be construed against the patentee.
24 8 Marka=, 52 F.3d at 987.
249 See id. In relation to legislative history see also United States v. John C. Grimberg
Co., 702 F.2d 1362, 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1983); in relation to prosecution history see supra
note 50 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (extrinsic evidence with patent
infringement). A prime example of the use of extrinsic evidence in statutory construction is
the referral to a dictionary to help determine the plain meaning of a word in a statute. See,
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Patents and statutes are created in entirely different ways. Patents are
created through a series of proceedings between an inventor and the Patent and
Trademark Office.25 1 Statutes are created through the legislative process. As a
result, the character of the public records used to help understand each of these
instruments differs considerably.
The specification and claims for a patent are fixed252 in a similar fashion as
the legislative history of a statute is fixed. However, the occurrence of events in
the prosecution of a patent may be in dispute.253 If such a dispute exists, the
inventor, his attorney, and even the examiner254 can be called to testify about
e.g., Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995) (determining the meaning of the
word "use" for a firearms conviction). In Bailey, the Court may have even relied on a study
by an expert. "Some linguists say that the Court in its opinion appears to have accepted a
linguistic study that was submitted with a brief by the lawyers for a defendant." Hope Viner
Sanborn, Looking for the Meaning of Life? Call a Linguist, 82 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 28,
28.
251 See supra Part II.C.1.
252 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
253 See, e.g., Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 645 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("Both sides have raised questions as to the effect of prosecution history of the reissue
... and both differ greatly in their account of what happened during that
proceeding.... From the record, it is impossible to tell what transpired during the interview
[with the examiner].").
254 See Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 431-32 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
Mhe general rule [is] that a patent examiner cannot be compelled to testify regarding his
"mental processes" in reaching a decision on a patent application. Fischer & Porter Co.
v. Coming Glass Works, 61 F.R.D. 321, 322, 181 USPQ 329, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 176 USPQ 349, 349 (E.D. Va. 1972); Shaffer
Tool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 USPQ 170, 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970), later proceeding,
175 USPQ 613, 614 (S.D. Tex. 1972); In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ 86, 89 (E.D. Va.
1969). See also American Cyanamid v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757, 778-79, 150 USPQ 135,
150-51 (6th Cir. 1966), later proceeding, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968). The courts have
held, however, that patent examiners may be deposed if the questions are limited to
factual matters and if the questioning does not delve into "hypothetical or speculative
areas" or the examiner's "bases, reasons, mental processes, analyses or conclusions."
Shaffer Tool Works, 167 USPQ at 171; accord Fischer & Porter Co. v. Coming Glass
Works, 61 F.R.D. at 322, 181 USPQ at 329; Standard Packing Corp. v. Curwood, Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 134, 136, 180 USPQ 235, 256 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Monsanto Co., 176
USPQ at 349; In re Mayewsky, 162 USPQ at 89; see also Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure § 1701.01; Lupo, The Impact of In re Mayewsky: What Should An Examiner
Be Allowed To Testify To?, 55 1 Pat. Off. Soc'y 216 (1973).
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the disputed events. However, any gaps in the legislative history of a statute are
not subject to the same kind of inquiry. For example, one side in a trial cannot
call a senator to the stand and ask her about events leading to the passage of a
statute.255 The court is stuck with the ordinary meaning of the language in the
statute256 and any available legislative history. 257 Thus, the materials available
for construing a patent can be different in nature from those available for
construing a statute.
This difference is the reason why disputes regarding what happened during
prosecution should remain the purview of the jury in the absence of an adequate
written record.258 As mentioned above, the determination of these disputes
requires a credibility judgment-the archetype of a factual issue. 259 In addition,
as the above analysis illustrates, this type of dispute also falls outside the
analogy between patents and statutes. This analogy is the basis for a proper
determination that claim construction is generally an issue for the court. Thus,
these types of factual disputes do not properly share the question of law
character of interpreting claims based on the language of the claims, the
specification, and the settled prosecution history.
Id.
255 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. "The Senators and Representatives ... for any
Speech or Debate in either House... shall not be questioned in any other Place." Id.
Alexander Bickel has suggested that this clause is necessary, because "lit is simply
unthinkable that members of legislative majorities should from time to time be subject to
cross-examination in various courts over the country regarding their state of mind when they
voted." ALExANDER M. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME CouRT AT
THE BAR OF PoLncs 215 (1962). The issue can become clouded when other constitutional
considerations are involved. See generally Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of
Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REv. 879 (1985).
256 See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
257 See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994).
258 While this type of dispute may be rare historically (the author could find few
instances in the case history besides Howes, discussed supra notes 210-16 and accompanying
text), the practice surrounding examiner interviews may be fertile ground for such disputes.
As discussed supra note 47, the applicant and the examiner should create an adequate written
record of the substance of any interview. However, records can be lost or destroyed, such as
by the fire that destroyed the Patent Office on December 15, 1836, or the applicant or the
examiner may simply fail to include an important fact in the record that at the time seemed
trivial. In this regard, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures recognizes that "[t]he
action of the Patent and Trademark Office cannot be based exclusively on the written record
in the Office if that record is itself incomplete through failure to record the substance of
interviews." MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMNNG PROCEDURE, supra note 47, § 713.04, at 700-
107.




A. Construction of Claim Language: Generally a Matter of Law
Patents are best analogized to statutes. In terms of Seventh Amendment
analysis, this means that no general right to a jury construction of claim
language exists.26° In addition, just as statutory language is interpreted by
judges, claim language should be interpreted by judges. Just as judges look at
the ordinary meaning and legislative history of a statute to understand statutory
language, judges should look at the ordinary meaning of the language in the
claims, the specification, and the prosecution history to understand claim
language. Thus, by and large, the Markman ruling is correct.
The Markman ruling can be viewed as a slight modification of the rule in
the middle of the road cases in the precedent. Those cases hold that a dispute
about the meaning of a term in a claim does not necessarily create an issue of
fact. Now, under Markman, such a dispute does not create an issue of fact. The
majority of those cases would have come out exactly the same (procedurally
and substantively) under the Markman ruling. One exception is Howes, a case
where the prosecution history was in question.261
B. Dispute Regarding Occurrences During Prosecution: A Question of
Fact
A dispute regarding the occurrence of an event during the prosecution of a
patent is almost the archetype of a factual issue that should go to a jury.262
Statutory construction does not involve any analogous type of issue.263 The
different nature of prosecution history as compared to legislative history
explains why this discrepancy exists. This discrepancy does not mean that the
entire analogy of a patent to a statute is fatally flawed. The discrepancy only
indicates that the analogy is not perfect. Therefore, the analogy should not be
taken too far, and disputes regarding the occurrence of events in the
prosecution of a patent that are not settled by the written record should remain
the purview of the jury.
260 See supra notes 229-34, 248-50 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
2 62 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
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C. Closing Observations
In Markman, the caveat about disputed events in the prosecution history
would not have mattered. No such disputes were present. Instead, a dispute
existed about the interpretation of claim language based on the written record.
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, this issue is extremely similar to
interpretation of statutory language. The patent to statute analogy shows that no
Seventh Amendment right to jury interpretation of claim language exists in such
a situation. Therefore, in a case such as Markman, interpretation of claim
language as a matter of law is proper.
